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Exonerations Change Judicial 
Views on Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel by Adele Bernhard 
e American public is fascinated with criminal jus- 
tice. Crime stories titillate. They're the daily fare on 
television newscasts, the subject of "true crime" T" 
bestsellers, and the front-page stories in newspapers and 
magazines nationwide. Today, it is the story of exonerations 
of the wrongly convicted that has captured the public's 
imagination. In recent nlonlhs, the New KWIC TI'YIZPS 
painstalungly explored how a group of young men convict- 
ed of raping and assaulting the "Central Park jogger" had 
been wrongly convicted--despite their taped confessions. 
Ne~vsday published a four-part series on 13 wrongly con- 
victed individuals in New York alone. Pamde maguine fea- 
tured "It Could Happen to Any of Us," by Jack Newfield, 
describing how Ray Krone, a fornler Boy Scout and Little 
League ballplayer, was convicted of a niurder he did not 
commit in Arizona. PBS aired an hour-long special that 
illustrated the post-exoneration lives of wrongly convicted 
men. And The Exonerated-a play combining fiction with 
real-life events, was an off-Broadway hit. 
It is not hyperbole to suggest that the interest and excite- 
ment generated by the stream of exoneration stories has 
encouraged hundreds of young people to attend law school. 
invigoratcd J.D. curriculum, revamped criine laboratories, 
and intf ueilced jury verdicts. 
Law evolves more slowly than pop culture or public atli- 
tude. Because most exonerations have not resulted in writ- 
ten legal opinions, their impact is oilly slowly seeping into 
case law. However, courts are influenced by the same news 
that sways the rest of us. Even without explicitly referring 
to innocence or wrongful convictions, modern trial courts 
are undoubtedly more llkely to admit expert testimony on 
the question of eyewitness identification because they are 
painfully aware of just how easily such witnesses-no mat- 
ter how honest or passionate---can be wrong. They are cer- 
tainly more inclined to view confessions suspiciously, espe- 
cially when it involves the very young, and to consider 
whether and to what extent police slant evidence. Finally, 
the fact that innocent people are routinely convicted- 
despite a full-blown jury trial at which they were represent- 
ed by defense counsel-suggests that courts should play a 
more active role in supervising the quality of crilninal 
defense services. 
Without overstating the case, there is some evidence that 
Adele Bernhard is an a,ssociate p~ofes~ooor rf1~n.v clt PL1(*e Lt-CIV 
Sch(x11 irz Wzire Phim, Nav Yolk, where she teut./lles t h ~  Criminal 
Defense Clinic arul tlie Post-Conviction Pwject. 
courts are doing inore to protect lhe rights of the accused to 
effectivc assistance of counsel. Some courts are relaxing the 
overly restrictive standard by which i~ldividual post-convic- 
tion claims are judged. Others have become more receptive 
to affirmattve litigation challellging the provision of crimi- 
nal defense services on Sixth Anlendnlent grounds. Finally, 
at least one circuit has abrogated the virtual inimunity that 
currently protects assigned and public defenders from mal- 
practice liability. This article discusses each of these devel- 
opments, focusing on the federal courts 'and on New York 
State, where 1 live and practice. 
Ambivalence to enforcing right to counsel 
Even as its criminal justice jurisprudence has evolved 
more restrictively, the Supreme Court has steadfastly insist- 
ed that the Constitution requires provision of counsel to 
anyone facing a loss of freedom as the result of a ci-iminal 
charge. (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); 
AEabamna IJ. Slzclton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).) Nonetheless, a 
right is only as potent as its enforcement, and the vigor of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been undercut by 
judicial reluctance to supervise the provision of criminal 
defense services. In part, this reticence is due to appropriate 
concern for finality and the difticulty of devising a standard 
of review that would spare appellate courts the task of 
combing through lengthy transcripts looking for trid errors. 
But thc reserve can also be attributed to the unstated belief 
that excellence in defense services is unnecessary. If every- 
one is guilty, it doesn't matter who does the defending. As 
Richard Posner puts it: 
I can coilfirm from my own experience as a judge that criminal 
defendcan& are generally poorly rcpresented. But if we are to be 
hardheaded we must recognize that this may not be an entirely 
bad thing. The lawyers wlw represent indigent cri~lunrtl defen- 
h t s  seem to be g o d  entwgh to reduce the probability of con- 
victing an innocent person to a very low level. If they were 
much better, either many guilty people would be acquitted or 
society would have to devote much greater resources to the 
prosecution ofc~-iminal cases. A bare-bones systenl for defense 
of ~ndigent criminal defendants may be optimal. 
(Richard A. Posner, The Pmhlemalics ofMor~12.s and Legal 
the or^ 163-64 (1999), cited in Ahhe S~?zitlz, Difference irz 
Crirniiztll Dejense arztl!  he Diference It Mi~ke,r, 11 WASH. 
U .  J.L. & Poriv 83 (2003).) 
Twenty years ago, when the Supreme Court decided 
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Strickland I). Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the proba- Focusing on prejudice 
bility of convicting an innocent person seemed very low Courts could increase the number of circumstances 
indeed. Our federal and state multilayered criminal justice where malfeasance is presumed to have prejudiced the out- 
systems, with pretrial procedures and con- ,,,, of fie trial-withoLlt resorting to a careful weighing 
stitutional protections, were thought to accurately differen- malfeasance against prosecutorial proof. ~h~~~ 
tiate between guilty persons and innocent ones. Judicial , already three situations where courts will presume prej- 
comfort with the operation of the criminal justice system is udice and reverse a conviction without measuring how the 
reflected in the Strickland decision, which diminishes the 
,ttorney 7s perfo1mance affected the outcome. prejudice is 
significance of counsel's role in the trial process. However, presumed when counsel and client are divided by a 
as the courts lose faith in police and prosecutorial ability pletely antagonistic relationship, rising to the level of an (or inclination) to distinguish between the guilty and the G~rreconcilable conflict;7 uP7ited v. M ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  159 3 d  
innocent, they are sure to refocus attention on the signifi- 1154 (9th cir, 19~)8), or when one lawyer actively 
cance of zealous defen ,e advocacy and search for ways to sents multiple individuals with inconsistent defenses, 
defense to do a better job of advocating Ctlyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Third, and more 
for their clients-so as to reduce the chances of convict- relevant lo this discussion, prejudice will be presmed 
ing the innocent. when an accused can claim legitimately that representation 
was so inadequate as to constitute a complete deprivation of 
Revisiting Sfrickland counsel, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), 
One way to influence the quality of defense services is decided with Strickland. The Cronic exception to the 
to reverse more cases for ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland standard applies to that small number of cases 
Judicial tolerance of malpractice has insulated ineffective where there has either been: 1 )  a complete deprivation of 
counsel, and the lack of adverse consequences for bad counsel at a critical stage in the life of a criminal case; or 2) 
lawyering has retarded efforts at where counsel has been asked 
reform. Certainly, reversal of an r to provide representation in an individual case gives that par- unusually Qfficult situation ticular defendant a better shot T h e C o u rt 1 et sta n d (such as that which occurred in 
at an accurate verdict. Powell v: Alabaina, where a 
Moreover, every reversal the Fifth Circuit's number of young black men 
teaches a general lesson about accused of capital rape in a hos- 
counsel's obligations, and 
_I tile southern town were potentially requires a greater decision in f3urdine ,,igne dcou investment in defense before the start of the trial); or 
resources. 3) where counsel fails "to sub- 
Currently, for a conviction to be reversed on the ject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial test- 
ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland ing," such as by conceding guilt in closing arguments, 
requires: 1) that the defense attorney's performance fell United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991 ). 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) a Although Croizic clearly provides an opening for courts 
reasonable probability that the malfeasance prejudiced the willing to more strictly scrutinize counsel's performance, 
outcome of the trial. (See Peter A. Joy and Kevin C. federal courts have been reluctant to step through it. That 
McMunigal, Has Gideon's Prumise Been Fulfilled?, 18:4 may be changing. Recent cases suggest that the federal 
CRIM. JUST. 46 (Summer 2003)) In other words, where bench is more willing to presume prejudice in cases where, 
there was overwhelming proof of guilt at trial, malprac- just a few years ago, it would have dismissed claims of 
tice will be excused even if that malpractice involved such ineffectiveness. For starters, in  2002, the Supreme Court let 
egregious behavior as sleeping, taking drugs, or drinking stand the Fifth Circuit decision in Bur-dine that condemned 
during trial, suffering through a psychotic break, or any as ineffective a defense attorney's sleeping through parts of 
number of other disasters that have been so extensively a capital trial. (Cockrell v. Burdine, 535 U.S. 1120 (2002) 
reported by journalists and scholars alike. (mem.).) There is no doubt that Burdine marks a significant 
Although it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will change, since less than 10 years earlier the Court had 
overrule Stricklund, recognition that ineffective assistance denied relief to another defendant whose attorney had also 
of counsel is contributing to convictions of innocent peo- slept through long portions of his client's capital trial. 
ple may spur courts to: ( I) either find prejudice more fre- (McFarlund v. Texas, 5 19 U.S. 1 1 I9 (1 997) (mem.) (deny- 
quently, or (2) to characterize counsel's error or omission ing review of McFarland's capital conviction).) Also last 
as egregious enough to avoid a careful prejudice analysis. year, the First Circuit in Ouher v. Guarion, 293 F.3d 19 (I  st 
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Cir. 2002), held that an attorney who failed to call her 
client, after promising the jury that she would testify, was 
ineffective and that the verdict ought to be overturned 
despite the court's inability to pinpoint exactly how the 
omission impacted the jury's decision. 
Courts may be hesitant to use the Cronic exception out 
of fear that such analysis will be impracticable, requiring 
appellate courts to spend more time scrutinizing trial 
records, or necessitating an unacceptable number of rever- 
sals. These worries are overstated. New York State has built 
a workable ineffective assistance of counsel jurispnidence 
on an approach very similar to what Cronic suggests. New 
York's highest court has rejected the federal Strickland 
standard in favor of its slightly different concept of "mean- 
ingful representation," which focuses on the " 'fairness of 
the process as a whole rather than [any] particular impact 
on the outcome of the case.' " (People v. Herziy, 95 N.Y.2d 
563,565 (2000).) 
So, for example, New York State's intermediate appellate 
court has found -that trial errors-counsel's lack of familiar- 
ity with the rules of evidence, failure to review impeach- 
ment material, inability to effectively cross-examine wit- 
nesses, solicitation of inadmissible identification testimony 
during cross-examination, failure to object when inadmissi- 
ble testimony was elicited on redirect, and misstatement in 
summation--can cumulatively deprive a person of mean- 
ingful representation without regard for whether that person 
would have been convicted in the absence of those errors. 
(People v. Cortez, 296 A.D.2d 465,745 N.Y.S.2d 467 
(2002); see also Prople 1). Gil, 285 A.D.2d 7,729 N.Y.S.2d 
121 (2001) (defense counsel's decision to start trial on the 
day of arrai-ment, despite his failure to conduct discovery 
or motion practice, is ineffective); People 1: EP?ck Brown, 
2002 N.Y. AD LEXIS 11617 (2d Dep't 2002) (defendant was 
deprived of a fair trial by counsel's failure to prepare for 
trial, his inability to effectively cross-examine the com- 
plaining witness, his unfamiliarity with the law regarding 
the admissibility of prompt outcry; and his indication in 
summation that he found the complaining witness's testi- 
mony believable).) Thus, New York cases may assist the 
federal courts to implement the Cronic exception to the 
Strickland prejudice requirement. 
Requiring counsel to investigate 
In a parallel developmnent, some federal courts are con- 
struing the Sixth Amendment to require defense counsel to 
conduct an investigation-at least in certain circ~unstances. 
This is most dramatically apparent in the recent Supreme 
Court case, Wiggins ~z Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003). which 
reversed a capital defendant's death sentence because his 
counsel did not conduct a thorough investigation of his 
childhood trauma in preparation for the mitigation hearing. 
Auspiciously, it doesn't look as though the emerging 
consensus that the Constitution requires effective counsel to 
conduct fact investigation is going to be confined to death 
penalty jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has suggested that counsel's significant trial deci- 
sions must be supported by a sound strategy, and that a 
sound strategy can't be formulated in the absence of an 
investigation. (See Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 
2003) (remanding to district court for factual hearing 
because the circuit was 'bnable to assess with confidence 
whether strategic considerations accounted for . . . counsel's 
decisions.").) In that determination, the circuit relied upon 
Strickland's admonition that "as a general matter, strategic 
choices made by counsel after a thorough investigation of 
the facts and law are 'virtually unchallengeable,' though 
strategic choices 'made after less than complete investiga- 
tion are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 
professional judgment support the limitation on investiga- 
tion.' " (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.) Thus, counsel 
"has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary." (Id. at 69 1 .) 
"Where counsel fails to make a reasonable investigation 
that is reasonably necessary to the defense, a court must 
conclude that the decision not to call an expert [for exam- 
ple] cannot have been based in strategic considerations and 
will thus be subject to review under Sfrickland's prejudice 
prong." (Pave1 r! Hollins, 261 F.3d 210,223 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(counsel ineffective in a child sexual abuse case where his 
failure to call a medical expert was based on an insufficient 
investigation.).) (Also see Lindstadt v. Keaize, 239 F.3d 191, 
201 (2d Cir. 2001) (to the same effect); and Thomas v. 
Kuhlrnan, 255 F. Supp. 2d 99 ( E.D.N.Y. 2003) (counsel 
failed to investigate the scene of the crime and as a result 
did not realize that prosecution witnesses were mistaken in 
their testimony, and there could be no strategic rationale for 
such an omission.).) 
Several circuits in addition to the Second have held simi- 
larly that counsel may be deemed ineffective for failure to 
conduct an investigation. (See Williams v. Washington, 59 
F.3d 673, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1995) (ineffective assistance, in 
part, for failure to investigate crime scene where doing so 
would have revealed evidence that, "given the layout of the 
home and the relatively crowded conditions, the alleged 
assault could not have taken place as claimed."); 
Washington v. Smith, 219 E3d 620 (7th Cir. 2000) (counsel 
was ineffective when he failed to interview or subpoena 
alibi witnesses, neglected to read police reports, and did not 
present any semblance of a tactical reason for that minimal 
diligence); Matthew v. Abramajrys, 319 F.3d 780, 789 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (aff~rrning the district court's grant of petitioner's 
habeas petition, because "[Qundamentally, the lawyer in 
this case, at best, occupied a space next to his client, but did 
not assist him. He did nothing to present potential alibi wit- 
-- - ----___ --__ __ __ - -  
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nesses, whose testimony would have been quite useful, 
even if not conclusive.); Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 
1000 (9th Cir. 2002) (where there was no basis to conclude 
that trial counsel's failure to investigate and present evi- 
dence that might have defeated jury's finding of intent and 
provided mitigation of the crime at sentence was tactical, 
court would find ineffective assistance of counsel.).) 
I don't mean to overstate the importance of what are still 
only a limited number of decisions, and I'm sure that some 
readers will think 1 am being unreasonably optimistic in 
characterizing the holdings as a development. Only time 
will tell. 
Prospective systemic litigation gets new life 
Another way for courts to enforce the Sixth Amendment 
and improve the quality of defense services is through the 
use of the injunction. Courts can order institutional change. 
Classic and dramatic examples of judge-ordered reform 
include transformation of the prison and educational sys- 
tems. Thus, for years scholars have urged advocacy groups 
to undertake structural reform litigation to enforce the right 
to effective assistance of counsel. (See Richard J. Wilson, 
Litigative Approaches to Er4forcing the Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel irz 
Crimivzul Cases, 14 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 203, 
216-17 (1986); Margaret H. 
Lemos. Note, Civil Challenaes 
727 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2001) (denying the 
state's motion to dismiss), ufl'd, 294 A.D.2d 69, 742 
N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 2002) and 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 
453 (Feb. 2003) (granting plaintiff's motion for a manda- 
tory permanent injunction pending further action by the 
legislature ).) 
Sonie backgro~und is necessary to appreciate the signifi- 
cance of the NYCLA decision. Each of New York State's 62 
counties pays for and manages its own public defense. New 
York City (which includes five counties) provides defense 
services to poor people through what is known as a mixed 
delivery system. The Legal Aid Society is the primary 
defender, representing approxiirately 85 percent of all the 
indigent criminal matters. Small, boutique alternate defend- 
ers exist in each of the boroughs. Private attorneys are 
assigned to handle conflict cases through an assigned coun- 
sel plan. 
New York City's assigned counsel plans (ACP) have 
some excellent characteristics. Full-time administrators 
manage the plans. Attorneys seeking to join must meet cer- 
tain qualifications. A screening committee reviews applica- 
tions, adjudicates complaints, and has undertaken extensive 
recertification drives. Finally, stafl' provides continuing legal 
education tailored to the needs 
and schedules of the ACP attor- 
neys, and circulates legal 
i I I i n g to updates and information about investigators, experts, and alter- 
" 
to the Use of Low-Bid native to incarceration options 
Contracts for Indigent Defense, 'a ke as'i g ned cases for clients,   ow ever, none of 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808 (2000); 
_I 
these structural advantages off- 
Note, Gideon's Promise have too many. sets the impact of resource 
Uf@lfilled: The Need for deprivation. Fees paid to ACP 
Litigated Reform of Indigent attorneys were set by the state 
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2000).) in 1986 at $40 an hour for in- 
Of course, bringing systemic litigation is extremely diffi- court work and $25 an hour for out-of-court work and were 
cult. The Abstention Doctrine prevents federal courts from not raised until 2003. 
intervening in state indigent defense systems, Younger v. Combined with the high cost of doing business in New 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and, until recently, state courts York City, ACP rates were driving attorneys off the criminal 
have been hesitant to insert themselves in what can be court and family panels. Those attorneys willing to take 
described as the legislative domain. (See, e.g., Kennedy v. assigned work were handling too many cases. Further, the 
Carlson, 5 4  N.W.2d 1 (Mjnn. 1996) (Minnesota Court of distinction between in- and out-of-court pay scales discour- 
Appeals rejected the Minnesota public defender's request aged preparation, investigation. and legal research, as well 
for additional funds so that his staff could provide services as client contact. 
that comported with constitutional requirements.).) The New York County Lawyers' Association brought 
Nonetheless, judicial reluctance to intervene ill the opera- suit in state court claiming that the low rates violated the 
tion of local criminal court operations may be waning. Sixth Amendment rights of those defendants and family 
Confronted with a lawsuit brought on behalf of all crimi- court respondents who were represented by ACP attorneys. 
nai defendants and family court respondents represented by State Supreme Court Justice Lorenzo Suarez rejected the 
private assigned counsel, a trial court judge in New York State's a.rgUment that a decision to raise the rates would 
has done more to improve the cluality of criminal defense improperly interfere with the State's sovereign ability to 
services than the legislat~ue had accomplished in almost allocate funds. He relied on Lucke?~ v. Harris, 860 F.2d 
two decades. (New York City Lnwyers'Association v. Pataki, 1012 (1 lth Cir. 19881, and the New York State standard for 
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evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel, to find that the 
low rates were adversely impacting the ability of ACP attor- 
neys to provide meaningful assistance, and ordered the state 
to raise its rates to $90 an hour for both in- and out-of-court 
work. 
Justice Suarez reasoned that, while "ordinarily, federal 
claims of ineffective assistance are judged case by case, 
after conviction, and measured against the Strickland stan- 
dard," ( 192 Misc. 2d at 429). in New York a different stan- 
dard prevails. In New York 
[wlhile the inquiry focuses oil the quality of the representation 
provided to the accused, the claim of ineEectiveness is ultinute- 
ly concerned with the fairness of the process as a whole rather 
than its paticular impact on the outcome of the case. The pur- 
pose is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary 
to justify society's reliance on the outcome of the proceedings. 
Notably, New York is concemed a5 much with the integrity of 
the judicial prcX:es,c as with the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(Supra at 43 1-32.) (citations onutted.) 
The State of New York imniediately appealed the deci- 
sion, which stayed the court order raising the rates. 
However, the New York legislature didn't wait to see what 
would happen, and voted to raise the assigned counsel rates 
to $75 for time spent in and out of court. 
The New York Supreme Court's willingness to intervene 
in the operation of the local criminal justice system and 
force a reallocation of funds may result from the growing 
consensus that public defense systems are inadequately pro- 
tecting the rights of the accused. 
Litigation designed to improve the quality of criminal 
defense services has been successful in other parts of the 
country, as well. In 1996, Connecticut's public defender 
settled a lawsuit brought by the American Civil Liberties 
Union challenging the state indigent defense system. The 
settlement raised the fees for private attorneys accepting 
those indigent cases that the public defender is unable to 
handle and permitted a number of new hires in the office of 
the public defense. Five years ago, the ACLU settled a 
class-action lawsuit against Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania, with a consent decree designed to overhaul 
the public defender's offlce there. 
This year in Georgia, the legislature has voted to create 
public defender o f~ces  in each of the state's 49 counties. It 
is fair to say that the state legislature responded to relentless 
pressure from the Southern Center for Human Rights, 
which had filed a total of six lawsuits seeking systemic 
reforms. Litigation designed to improve the quality of crim- 
inal defense services is currently pending in Quitman 
County, Mississippi, and in Montana where the ACLU of 
Montana is alleges that indigent defense services in seven 
counties are constitutionally deficient. "The state has failed 
to provide the counties with the funding and guidance need- 
ed to administer an indigent defense program adequately," 
said Scott Crichton, executive director of the ACLU of 
Montana, in a news release. "Under these circumstances, 
even the most diligent attorneys cannot provide competent 
representation." 
Court holds that public defender can be sued 
Finally, there is another tool for courts desiring to 
enhance the quality of criminal defense services, albeit one 
that is bound to be unpopular in the defender community. 
Courts could make it easier to sue public defenders for 
malpractice-especidly when administrative decisions con- 
tributed to it. 
Although defenders aren't guaranteed the sane kind of 
immunity that shields judges, police, and prosecutors from 
civil liability for errors made in the course of fulfilling their 
responsibilities, courts have made it difficult for criminal 
defendants to sue their counsel. On the one hand, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that when a public defender is per- 
forming the traditional role of an individual attorney for an 
- 
individual client, that lawyer is not a state actor and is thus 
not amenable to suit under the federal civil rights laws. 
(Polk County v. Dodsoiz, 454 U.S. 3 12 (198 I).) On the 
other hand, it is equally difficult to sue a public defender 
under state malpractice tort theory. Not only are claims of 
legal malpractice cumbersome to bring and difficult to 
prove, but also many states treat individual public defend- 
ers as civil servants with individual immunity (Scott v. City 
oJ'Niagaru Fulls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (1978) (holding 
that there is "no valid reason to extend . . . immunity to 
state and federal prosecutors and judges and to withhold it 
from state-appointed and state-subsidized defenders.).) 
Further, damages won against public defender offices are 
often capped. 
Commentators deplore these protections, which some 
see as an abridgment of the rights of the accused. (See 
Harold Chen, Malpractice Immunity: An Illegitimatr and 
IneJtective Response to the Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45 
DUKE L.J. 783 (1996); David Sadoff, The Public Defender 
as Private Offmder: A Retreat from Evolving Malpractice 
Liability Standurds jbr Public Defenders, 32 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 883 (Spring 1995); David J. Richards, The Public 
Dqfender Defenclnnt: A Model Statutory Approach to 
Public Defender Malpractice Liability, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 
5 11 (Fall 1994).) Their voices are being heard. 
In Nevada, an accused individual whose conviction had 
been reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel and 
whose indictment was subsequently dismissed-although 
not on grounds of innocence-brought suit in the federal 
district court against his individual public defender, the 
office that trained and supervised him, and the county that 
f ~ ~ n d e d  the office. (Miranda v. Clark County, 3 19 F.3d 
465 (9th Cir. 2003).) Miranda claimed that the chief 
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defender required lie detector tests to be administered to 
all of his clients, and provided fewer investigative and 
defense resources to those who failed. Miranda alleged 
that this policy was not an isolated instance, but a deliber- 
ate pattern and policy-part of a general refusal to prop- 
erly train and supervise lawyers. Miranda claimed that no 
investigation was conducted on his case as a result of the 
test results. (Id. at 468.) 
Affirming the district court determination, the Ninth 
Circuit found that Miranda's allegations, if proven, would 
be sufficient to establish against the public defender 
office and the county a claim of deliberate indifference to 
constitutional rights, reachable under the leading 
Supreme Court decisions on state and municipal liability, 
such as Monell v. Departmerzt of Social  service^, 436 
U.S. 658 (1978). 
I doubt there is another public defender office that 
uses polygraph tests as Nevada is alleged to have done. 
But all individual public defenders prioritize cases and 
allocate resources in some way. They must. No one can 
carry the caseloads that defenders shoulder without decid- 
ing which clients are going to get the most attention. 
Most public defender organizations provide little guidance 
to their staff about making those decisions and fail to 
review the decisions that are made. It seems entirely plau- 
sible that other innocent clients, upon release from jail, will 
sue for failing to investigate, to devote resources, or to train 
and evaluate staff. The Miranda v. Clark Courlty decision 
condemned an affirmative policy as systemically ineffec- 
tive, but there is no reason why another organization's 
omissions or failures might not likewise be considered 
bureaucratic malfeasance establishing liability. 
Exonerations of innocent individuals have taught the 
public and the courts to be more demanding of the police 
and the prosecutors. The police are already paying for 
careless work through larger jury verdicts and settle- 
ments. (In February 2003, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a 
$15 million jury verdict in favor of James Newsome, a 
wrongly convicted man.) The defense bar may find itself 
in the same position soon. The public will detnand better 
performance from the defense bar, and the courts will 
enforce those demands. 
